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grounds of its people" (United Nations 1994: Ch. 2, first unnumbered paragraphs, p. 14). Once they were protected by this language, governments were prepared to move the debate forward by joining the consensus even on parts of the language with which they were not in full agreement.3
While the resolutions and documents of Cairo are nonbinding, they are nonetheless important because they become part of the historical record of the United Nations, where they are included as recommendations that have been universally endorsed. If reaffirmed often enough by countries or other international bodies, these recommendations gradually take on the qualities of an international norm that exerts its own pressure to conformity by the global community. This is, of course, a very slow process, best measured in decades rather than years and probably applying to only a small subset of the recommendations produced by each major conference. Recommendations that do not command broad support, or that appear to be peripheral to the main task at hand, tend to fade from memory.4
In arriving at a consensus, UN conference documents evolve through a protracted series of negotiations, involving national governments, the conference secretariat, academic and technical specialists, and representatives of civil society. In this process much of the initial clarity and coherence is lost, and contentious issues tend to be elided or obfuscated; and, since the views of no delegation can be slighted or ignored, the recommendations multiply, new chapters may be added, and the document may lose its sense of direction and urgency. The ICPD final document conforms to this generalization. Within it, the diligent researcher will be able to find language supporting almost any course he or she may wish to pursue. Nevertheless, the overwhelming thrust of the Cairo document and the sense and tone of the aggregated recommendations are such that, if implemented, presage a major change of emphasis, even a paradigm shift, in the international community's approach to population growth.
Although academic demographers and economists have long debated the relationship between population growth and socioeconomic development (see, for example, Cassen 1994), members of the broader population community have acted for over 30 years in the belief that rapid population growth impedes development. The theoretical underpinnings of this belief had been developed in the 1950s by leading American demographers who argued that the rates of population growth in poor countries, especially those in Asia, not only were far higher than had been observed in industrialized countries during their demographic transition, but also originated from different causes. They questioned whether economic growth could occur in developing countries unless fertility had first been reduced.5 The most influential among these studies was the simulation project undertaken by Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover (1958) to examine the impact of India's population growth on its economic development. This study sug-gested that lower fertility would be followed by measurable increases in per capita income over and above what may be obtainable with continued high fertility. Since the provision of family planning services was expected to lower birth rates and was a relatively low-cost intervention, governments in countries with high rates of population growth were encouraged to introduce family planning programs.
In later years, the prognostications underlying the Coale-Hoover model were tempered, as many developing countries shared in the booming world economy of the 1960s. Calmed by the lessened sense of crisis, many academic social scientists questioned and modified the model, suggesting at times that rapid population growth is a minor economic problem or no problem at all and that economic development would suffice to bring fertility under control (see, for example, Easterlin 1967; Kocher 1973; Kuznets 1967; National Research Council 1986; Simon 1977 Simon , 1981 . Nevertheless, policymakers in poor countries came to accept the basic premise that rapid population growth and rapid economic development are incompatible. Today, the deepening poverty, indebtedness, and political turmoil in much of Africa might suggest that the message of the Coale-Hoover model still has validity on that continent, if not elsewhere.
The agenda advanced at the ICPD and enshrined in the Program of Action reflects a very different type of thinking about the population issue in the developing world. The new model asserts that programs that are demographically driven, and are intended to act directly on fertility, are inherently coercive and abusive of women's right to choose the number and timing of their children.6 Such programs should be replaced by others that "empower" women by increasing their educational levels, providing them with satisfying jobs, lightening their domestic responsibilities, and otherwise raising their status in the family and community. While family planning services should be provided, they should be only one element in comprehensive programs of reproductive health services, designed and managed with intensive inputs from women. Feminists advocating this agenda assert that once women become more empowered and development advances, women will opt to have fewer children and population growth will slow.7 For many in the women's movement,8 however, the effect on population trends would be incidental because it is the effect on women's rights, status, and empowerment that matters to them.
It is our view that this shift away from attention to population as an aggregate phenomenon is the most unexpected feature of the Cairo Program of Action. In later sections of this article we suggest how the shift came about, focusing primarily on the roles played by the international women's movement and the United States government. As members of the population community are aware, however, the last six months of the preparatory process were marked by an intense ideological conflict between the US government and the Holy See over abortion and other reproductive issues raised by both the women's movement and the US government. We also briefly analyze this historic battle.
The preparatory process for Cairo
Like the preparations for all global United Nations conferences, preparations for Cairo stretched over several years, from the initial General Assembly Resolution in 1989 (GA Resolution 1989/91) deciding to hold an international population meeting in 1994 under UN auspices, to the conference itself in September 1994. In the intervening years, important procedural work was undertaken during 1990-91 to set up the structure of the conference, establish the formal Preparatory Committee (commonly referred to as Prepcom), and form the ICPD Secretariat within the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).9 The main substantive preparations were made in the later period, 1992-94. The purpose of the Cairo conference differed somewhat from that of the previous two conferences, and especially from the 1984 Mexico City conference, whose objective was to revisit the World Population Plan of Action adopted at Bucharest in 1974 and to develop recommendations for its further implementation (see Finkle and Crane 1985) . For Cairo, the identification of "sustained economic growth and sustainable development," along with population, as the overall theme of the conference (ECOSOC Resolution 1991/93) necessitated a completely new document and required the meeting to take cognizance of environmental concerns.
The Cairo conference benefited substantially from the demographic expertise and experience of the UN Population Division, which had played a critical role within the Secretariat at both Bucharest and Mexico City. While the preparations for Cairo followed the general form of all UN conferences, they were far more elaborate and sophisticated than the preparations for the population conferences at either Bucharest or Mexico City. Bucharest was the first population conference at which governments were represented, and the Secretariat and major donors expected that it would proceed smoothly, as had the two previous United Nations population conferences, held in Rome in 1954 and in Belgrade in 1964.
These previous meetings, however, had been gatherings of population specialists and technical experts who were invited in their private capacities or represented agencies doing scientific work in the field of population. The possibility of controversy was greatly reduced by restricting the agenda primarily to technical issues of demographic research (Symonds and Carder 1973: 82-86) . These specialists had relatively few difficulties with the draft document prepared by their counterparts at the United Nations. At Bucharest, therefore, the Secretariat was taken aback when gov-ernment delegations chose to use the meeting as a vehicle to advance political demands (Finkle and Crane 1975) . Having learned from this experience, the Secretariat for Mexico City instituted a more elaborate preparatory process that combined both technical and political elements to ensure that political and ideological issues would surface and be resolved prior to the meeting itself. Even this new process proved inadequate to the task, and the conference was overtaken by a major political crisis engineered by the United States government (Finkle and Crane 1985) .
Believing that the best way to prevent surprises at Cairo would be to open the discussions as widely as possible, the ICPD Secretariat embarked on a strenuous, well-orchestrated series of meetings, approximately 35 in number, and invited NGO participation. The idea was that this laborious process would ensure that controversial issues would be aired and resolved before the draft Program of Action was taken to Cairo for final approval. Thus, starting in January 1992 with six Expert Group meetings charged with identifying the issues to be addressed, the schedule included five regional intergovernmental conferences, meetings of intraregional governmental associations, a meeting of Eminent Persons, several Roundtables on specific issues, and numerous additional formal and informal intergovernmental meetings.'0 The reports of all these meetings were reflected in successive drafts of conference documents prepared by the ICPD Secretariat and discussed at the second and third meetings of the Preparatory Committee in May 1993 and April 1994. Notwithstanding the elaborate care given to producing a document that would be acceptable to all participants, there were serious conflicts over parts of the draft Program of Action, as was evidenced by the position taken at the Third Preparatory Committee Meeting. Thus, although consensus on most of the document was achieved before Cairo, a number of delicate issues remained to be negotiated at the conference itself.
It would be a mistake to assume that the role of the ICPD Secretariat was confined to orchestrating meetings and synthesizing the views of participants. The responsibilities and vision of the Secretariat go far beyond the role that is frequently ascribed to "the secretariat' of an organization. While the Secretariat was desirous of having a well-run conference and of producing a document to which a large majority of the participants could subscribe, it was equally concerned to run a conference that would be seen as historically significant. For this purpose, a simple reaffirmation of the population policies and demographic goals of the past 20 years was unlikely to suffice." Although Nafis Sadik had not been perceived as an ardent feminist when she first went to UNFPA under Rafael Salas, the late first Executive Director of the Fund, she came gradually to embrace women's interests, partly out of personal convictions and partly through her continuing dia-logue with women's advocates. She was confirmed in this approach by the strong support of US foundations and of several Western governments, especially those of the United States and the Nordic countries. Having endorsed this objective, Sadik remained firmly in control of drafting the document and did not hesitate to overrule groups whose views she did not endorse.
Inevitably, the decision to take an individual rather than societal approach to population growth-for example, to stress individuals' interest in having access to family planning services rather than the collective interest in having such services available to individuals-was not entirely free of difficulties and costs. Under Sadik's direction, the original draft of the Program of Action was revised more than a dozen times; in this process the demographic chapter was severely cut and lost much of its punch. This dilution of the document's demographic content has led population specialists to criticize the inadequacies of relying on a policy focused on the individual in those areas of the world where there is little demand for contraception, where economic development is stagnant or declining, and where religion and culture tend toward pronatalism (van de Kaa 1995; Westoff 1994 Westoff , 1995 .
Abortion also presented Sadik with a dilemma. As Executive Director of UNFPA, Sadik was inhibited from promoting the legalization of abortion; as Secretary-General of the Cairo conference, and as a physician, she was aware that unsafe abortion is responsible for numerous maternal deaths each year and believed that this issue should be addressed in the document. After much discussion with members of the Secretariat, she decided to treat abortion as a major public health issue that governments were urged to address, rather than as a matter of women's rights. Shortly before the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee, however, Sadik responded to the continued demands of women's groups and Western governments to take a stronger position; against the advice of some of her UNFPA colleagues she added a sentence stating that safe abortion should be available in cases of rape and incest. This change, regarded by many as an act of courage, also proved to be one of several events that inspired the exceptionally strong protest leveled by the Holy See against the draft Cairo document. The language that was finally adopted at Cairo is reproduced in paragraph 8.25 of the final document (United Nations 1994: 61-62).
The political environment of the conference
The Cairo conference took place against a background of momentous geopolitical change that brought to an end the structure of power that had shaped international relations for 50 years. The collapse of the Soviet Union, prefigured by the fall of the Berlin Wall barely two years before the main preparations for the conference got underway, removed a source of ten-sion and introduced a new dynamic into global politics that was ultimately reflected in the Cairo process. Gone was the ever-present fear among conference organizers that East-West conflicts might erupt to derail the proceedings, as indeed they had almost done at Bucharest and Mexico City Crane 1975, 1985) ; in its place was a new openness and willingness to cooperate among members of the former Soviet bloc, which simplified the work of the ICPD Secretariat. The political climate in which the conference and its preparatory process took place was also improved by the signing of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. At previous conferences, supporters of the Palestinian cause had frequently disrupted the debate by demanding that the document contain references to the right of self-determination as well as the rights of refugees and people under occupation, both of which topics are included in the Geneva Convention and other international agreements. Palestinians also repeatedly argued for the inclusion of a statement about freedom of movement within the occupied territories (Joseph Chamie, personal communication, 6 May 1994).
Changes in the balance of power
The collapse of the Soviet Union did not simply remove one superpower, leaving the other as undisputed world leader. The United States lost standing as well. Through much of the Cold War, the standing of the United States had rested not only on its military might, but also on the economic strength that permitted it to sustain its political and philosophical commitment to the Western strategic alliance. The vibrant US economy allowed it to extend economic assistance to developing countries; additionally, to prevent the spread of communism, US wealth was employed to attract and maintain client states around the world. In the late 1960s, moreover, under President Lyndon Johnson, the United States launched the "Great Society,I a vast program of social regeneration at home, while maintaining its Cold War commitments abroad and engaging in the Vietnam war. The combination of these costly domestic and international policies placed a strain on the US economy from which it has yet to recover.
Although the United States still has a strong economy, by almost any indicator there has been a decline in its economic standing relative to other industrial nations. Many Americans have come to recognize that for a large part of the US population standards of living have ceased to grow, that the income gap between rich and poor has been widening, and that a growing array of serious domestic social problems must be dealt with. With the fear of communism no longer providing an overriding imperative, prominent American political figures are questioning, more than at any previous time, the wisdom and ability of carrying the global responsibilities of former years.
More and more, the United States is urging its Western partners to absorb a growing proportion of development assistance. With Germany straining under the cost of reunification and much of Europe still in recession, attention has been increasingly focused on Japan, which has become the largest contributor to overseas development assistance.
One might infer from this that Japan's economic prominence would translate into political influence and that Japan would be highly visible at such meetings as the Cairo conference. At Cairo, however, as at other international conferences, Japan remained virtually silent. There are two principal reasons for the low profile adopted by Japan. The first and more general is that Japan has become the most successful mercantile state of modern times. As salesman to the world, Japan has no wish to offend its customers and potential customers by expressing its opinions on sensitive issues, whether they be human rights, women's status, or the various forms of the family.
Second, Japan is still uncertain of its place in the world and feels itself vulnerable to criticism for its behavior in World War II. It is particularly sensitive to the legacy of ill-will among its Asian and Pacific neighbors that suffered from Japanese occupation before and during the war. Japan's unease over its past may have led it to adopt a low-key position at Cairo, especially as abortion, which had sparked serious controversy and debate, has long been a favored method of family limitation in Japan. Thus, as the world is commemorating the 50th anniversary of the ending of World War II, Japan remains hesitant to take the prominent place in international affairs that its economic strength would otherwise command.
Another major change in the political environment of Cairo was the status and influence of the Group of 77 (G77). At Bucharest, the G77, a loose association of nonaligned states, was one of the most prominent and effective actors. Not only did the G77 speak generally for the developing countries, it also took a leading role in attempting to bring about a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which would have meant a major transformation of the global economy (Finkle and Crane 1975) . The G77 played a much lesser role at Mexico City and, notwithstanding some significant contributions by individuals and individual countries, was even more subdued at Cairo. As most of the world's population growth takes place in developing countries, and as they are the primary recipients of population assistance, the failure of the G77 to make its presence more strongly felt deserves comment.
The most important reason for the lack of visibility of the G77 at Cairo was that the organization no longer represents a cohesive whole. At the time it was formed in the 1960s there was far less diversity among developing countries than there is today. When the alliance was formed, developing countries in Asia, Africa, and even Latin America were uniformly poor and, at most, in the early stages of the demographic transition. Many had recently achieved independence from one or another of the colonial powers, and they were united by a strong anticolonial bond. Moreover, developing countries as a group had produced a number of towering leaders-Nehru of India, Nkrumah and Nyerere of sub-Saharan Africa, and Nasser of Egypt among them-who gave voice to the aspirations of their peoples to participate in world affairs on an equal footing with their former masters.
During the ensuing 30 years, the G77 has increased in numbers and has undergone marked economic and demographic stratification. Parts of Asia cannot by any stretch of the word be considered as still developing; several of them have completed their demographic transitions. At the other end of the spectrum, some countries are declining economically and show little progress toward demographic transition. On a worldwide basis, the consciousness of ethnic and religious differences is more important today than in the heady days of nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. Quite simply, in 1994 the countries of the G77 had much less in common, and their interests and aspirations no longer coincided.
The influence of location
In a variety of ways, the location of an international conference also influences the process and outcomes of the deliberations. The host country has a larger than usual investment in achieving a successful event, and its voice carries additional weight by virtue of its role as host. Less obviously, the quality of the logistical arrangements made for the accommodation and transportation of the delegates, press, and observers can do much to reduce inconveniences, ease tensions, and furnish the comforts that facilitate a productive meeting. The selection of Cairo as the conference site was not part of a master plan but was made largely through a process of elimination. The original intent soon after Mexico City was to hold the 1994 meeting in Beijing. Later this idea had to be dropped because of the controversial nature of China's human rights and population practices. Latin America was also ruled out because the Earth Summit was to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Western Europe was considered too expensive to attract a wide attendance, and many felt that Africa was due to have a major conference. Cairo was one of the few cities on that continent that could accommodate the number of people who were expected to attend. Because of recent violence and threats against foreigners, there was concern that the United Nations would change the site of the meeting. The Egyptian government, however, was determined that the conference would take place in Cairo as planned and conveyed this sentiment emphatically to United Nations personnel. President Mubarak and his government took great care to ensure the security of the delegates and visitors to the conference. In addition, it probably did not hurt the cause of Egypt that the current Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, is an Egyptian.
The choice of Egypt, a moderate Muslim state, as host country proved felicitous after the Holy See became alarmed over its perception that the US government intended to promote abortion as an internationally recognized method of family planning. Egyptian officials, including Maher Mahran, the Minister of Population and Family Affairs, were highly supportive of the ICPD Secretariat and worked hard in trying to reassure the Holy See. Immediately before the conference, in response to the Vatican's attempt to forge alliances with fundamentalist Islamic states, including Iran and Libya, Egypt quietly mobilized the voices of moderate Islam in support of the conference.'2 As a result of Egypt's efforts, the United Nations was spared the embarrassment of the withdrawal of Muslim countries from attending the conference. Although a number of such countries initially indicated an intention not to attend, in the end only four failed to turn up: Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. In addition to its role in calming the controversy over the abortion issue, Egypt also helped to ensure a hearing for the views of the Group of 77, whose current leader, Algeria, weakened by political unrest at home, was unable to exercise the strong leadership it had exercised at the Bucharest conference and on many occasions since.
The politics of the new paradigm
Even before 1994, developing country governments had reached a clear consensus on the need to continue vigorous efforts to reduce the rate of population growth.'3 Although social science research on the precise relationship between population growth and economic development remains inconclusive, most policymakers are convinced that rapid population growth limits a nation's ability to improve the standard of living of its people.'4 By this time, also, nearly all developing countries had introduced population policies, and there was mounting evidence that widespread access to modern contraceptives had been successful in lowering fertility (Bongaarts, Mauldin, and Phillips 1990; Freedman and Freedman 1992; Lapham 1987). There was emerging evidence, moreover, that vigorous delivery of contraceptive, motivational, and informational services was capable of lowering fertility in the absence of significant social and economic change (see Cleland et al. 1994 ). In the years immediately prior to Cairo, there was every reason to believe that the governments assembled there would commit themselves to improving their efforts to bring population growth under control as a means of enhancing the productive capacities of their people. Instead, the Cairo deliberations and the final document took a different tack. Rather than calling for a redoubling of efforts to reduce population growth to more manageable levels, the document avoids a demographic and populationist'5 approach and endorses an individualistic plan that gives pride of place to women's rights, status, and empowerment. The recommendations in the Program of Action reflect the assumption that fertility will not fall until a number of preconditions have been satisfied: children survive, men take responsibility for contraception, and women have the right to control their own fertility-as well as the political power that will enable them to secure this right (United Nations 1992-94).
In formulating this position and shepherding it through the Cairo process, feminists in the international women's movement, with the strong support of some Western industrialized countries, were thus returning to the earliest roots of the birth control movement. Many of the first birth controllers were anarchists and social reformers, most of them male, who saw the ability to control fertility as a way to strengthen the power of the working classes (Fryer 1965 ). Later, birth control was adopted by radical feminists as part of their movement for women's rights, emancipation, and political reform (Fryer 1965 The importance of Rio While the women's decade furnished the intellectual and ideological ammunition employed by feminists in their assault on population programs at the ICPD, the Rio de Janeiro Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) two years earlier brought together the disparate forces that would engage in the Cairo debate. If environmentalists saw the population community as a natural ally in their efforts to reduce the impact of population growth on renewable resources and prevent other types of environmental degradation, populationists were also looking for a new and dynamic source of support. After 12 years in which the Reagan and Bush administrations had downplayed the effects of rapid population growth and given only tepid support to population programs, the population community felt a need for political help and turned to the environmental movement. Environmental concerns attracted a broad constituency among the general public, foundations found them popular and worthy objects of their largesse, and a number of mainline environmental organizations were developing research and action programs that attempted to link environmental and population variables. Judging, however, that discussion of population at Rio would divert attention from the issues of poverty and sustainable development to which it attached great importance, the Vatican exercised its considerable influence to eliminate population topics from the formal agenda (Cohen 1993 ).
Although population was excluded from formal discussion at UNCED, it became a subject of lively debate-and deep division-among environmentalists and feminists at the NGO forum that was held alongside the conference itself. Feminist organizations had a number of reasons for the attention they gave to the Rio conference. On the one hand, those who concerned themselves with the effects of development on women had a direct and substantive interest in environmental problems, to which the slums of Rio de Janeiro bore witness. On the other hand, women's health activists were alarmed that many environmentalists were making a direct connection between population growth and environmental degradation. They feared that an uncritical acceptance of this relationship would reinforce the demographic dimensions of population policies that they were determined to repudiate (Cohen and Richards 1994). Many newcomers to the environmental movement received their introduction to the complexities of population policies, and especially to the negative feminist view of family planning programs, from feminist spokespersons during and after UNCED.17 The Rio conference thus proved to be a critical step in implementing a global strategy to advance a broad feminist agenda through the medium of UN conferences, each of which would address part of the whole. 18 Thefeminist campaign The international women's movement has elaborated an agenda with broad appeal to constituencies in the population, health, and development arenas. In the population field, its arguments are especially attractive to a new generation that has not experienced the difficulties of initiating either development or fertility decline and has less sense of urgency than did the generation it is supplanting. Nevertheless, it is not solely the freshness of its ideas to a new generation that enabled the women's movement to succeed at Cairo. Two other factors also proved important. First, as a result of the women's liberation movement in the United States, many women who are deeply imbued with feminist ideals are now found in high-level policy and management positions in foundations and in family planning, health, research, and advocacy agencies. In the ensuing 11 months prior to Prepcom III, at which time it was hoped that the draft document would be approved by consensus, feminist activists undertook an energetic and sophisticated campaign to gain acceptance for their position. Women worked hard to bring other women to-gether; they sidelined radical feminist views that they judged to have little chance of winning approval; they worked intensively with sympathetic population/family planning agencies to find language that might be acceptable to both sides.23 Feminists gave lectures, appeared on panels, lobbied the ICPD Secretariat, gave briefings to State Department officials and members of Congress, participated in numerous intersessional meetings (between prepcoms) where they helped draft language for the document, and secured a significant number of places on the US delegation.
Feminists The victory of the Clinton/Gore team in the presidential elections of 1992 was welcomed by the US population establishment, who saw in it a sign that their 12 years in the wilderness were over. Both Clinton and Gore were known to be concerned about the implications of global population growth for development and the environment. Moreover, both men had liberal views on women's need for access to family planning programs and safe abortion. Immediately after taking office, Clinton provided clear evidence that things had changed. He reversed the "Mexico City policy' that prohibited US funds from being used to assist any agency that engaged in abortion-related activities, even with funding from private sources; he also promised to reinstate funding for UNFPA and IPPF in the next budget cycle, and later requested an additional $100 million for the US international population program for fiscal 1994.
The appointment of Timothy Wirth as Counselor in charge of population matters at the Department of State was also greeted with satisfaction by international population professionals. Wirth, a charismatic and energetic former US Senator from Colorado, was known to be deeply concerned about both population and sustainable development, and women's issues. His speech at Prepcom II announcing that the United States was "back' as a world leader in population and laying out a "comprehensive and farreaching new approach to international population issues" was greeted with tumultuous applause by the delegates.24 Other Clinton appointments, notably those of Donna Shalala, a former University of Wisconsin president, as head of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and Joycelyn Elders, a physician and close political associate of Clinton's from Arkansas, as Surgeon General, also gave promise of liberal changes in the policy domains having to do with the family and reproduction.
As favorable as was the arrival of the Clinton administration for global population policy, the timing of the change was less than propitious: by January 1993, when President Clinton took office, the ICPD Secretariat, national governments, and experts had already invested heavily in identi-fying the issues that should be addressed at Cairo.25 These were to be presented as an outline of the document for discussion at the second Prepcom in May 1993, the meeting at which Wirth made his public debut as the US government's point man on population. Although the Clinton administration did not delay unduly in nominating Wirth for this position, it inherited a State Department that was weak in the population area.26 Population affairs, other than migration and refugees, were represented by a single, relatively low-level coordinator, a Bush administration appointee. Wirth brought two key aides with him from the Senate, but it was many months before he was designated Under Secretary for Global Affairs, which included responsibility for population, and was able to appoint staff.27 Inevitably, also, it took time for the new office to develop expertise in the area.
During this period, before Wirth and his staff were fully in command, USAID stepped into the gap and played an important role in helping define the substantive basis for the US position.28 The Office of Population wrote the briefing paper on population for an interagency meeting held immediately after the Clinton administration took office.
The US delegation to the European Population Conference in Geneva in March 1993 was led by the Director of USAID's Office of Health, who was also the Acting Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Research and Development.29 Wirth's speech at Prepcom II was drafted by USAID, and at various times the Office of Population seconded three staff members to the State Department to assist with the preparations and negotiations for Cairo.
Although USAID's mandate in population has always been the reduction of global population growth, the issues within its purview are far different from those of the State Department. Historically, the State Department has considered population in the light of US and global security and, broadly speaking, as a development and economic assistance issue; today, population's relationships to the environment and sustainable development have been added to the list. By contrast, from its inception USAID's Office of Population has considered the delivery of family planning services to be its primary mission. It was inevitable that the issues considered most salient by USAID would differ from those that might have been identified by the State Department.
From the moment the Clinton administration took office, AID's Office of Population had started to consider how best to respond to the new directions that were emerging from the ICPD preparations. Because of disagreement within the Office over the appropriate balance between AID's traditional mandate in population and the new focus on the individual, the Office of Population proceeded with caution. As part of the process, AID held discussions with women's groups in an effort to identify parts of the women's agenda that could be incorporated incrementally into its ongoing programs. By the time Wirth made his appearance at Prepcom II, the Office of Population was moving toward incorporating its family planning program into a broader framework of maternal and reproductive health.30 In elaborating the US position, Under Secretary Wirth decided to canvass public opinion in a manner more typical of elected political leaders on Capitol Hill than of officials at the State Department. Wirth and his staff made themselves available to a broad spectrum of representatives of civil society. Environmentalists, health organizations, religious leaders of many denominations, pro-life and pro-choice groups, family planning agencies, and foundations made their way to Washington to present their views. In a move reminiscent of the Clinton/Gore bus tours across the country during the Clinton presidential campaign, Wirth's officials attended coast-to-coast town meetings to solicit the views of ordinary Americans.3' Back in Washington, negotiations were entered into with the major proponents of the women's agenda. The one constituency that does not seem to have been seriously consulted was the community of demographers and other academic social scientists who have provided the theoretical and analytical underpinnings of US international population policy for nearly 30 years. As a result, the hard analytical questions that might have been raised concerning the demographic implications of the feminist agenda were elided, leaving an opening for those more ideologically inspired.32 As Wilmoth and Ball have observed (1992: 662), 'an important function of demographic science is to serve as a corrective for the excesses of policy advocacy in population matters."
Once formed, the US position was advanced with determination and skill through every available channel. Collaboration with the ICPD Secretariat, as with women's organizations and other NGOs, was close, with exchanges taking place daily. Consultation with and lobbying of foreign missions to the United States and the United Nations were continuous, and US officials participated in numerous intersessional meetings with governments on a variety of delicate issues. At Cairo itself, Under Secretary Wirth deployed a large, highly disciplined, and effective delegation that seldom spoke on the floor but worked around the clock with developing country delegations to produce acceptable language in the short time available. In the judgment of most seasoned observers, the United States, the Holy See, and the women's movement were the three most organized, best disciplined, and effective participants in the conference.
The battle over abortion
Earlier in this article we observed that the exceptionally elaborate preparations for the ICPD were motivated, in part, by a desire that no unanticipated issues or controversies arise to divert attention from the main pur-pose of the meeting. As late as September 1993, when we first interviewed members of the ICPD Secretariat, we were told that there was no reason to expect any major conflicts to occur. With the clarity of hindsight, however, one can see that the abortion battle was almost inevitable.
It has been evident for some time that Pope John Paul II is engaged in an epic struggle against the individualism and consumerism of Western life (John Paul 11 1987, 1993, 1995 One can only speculate on what provoked the extraordinary resistance of the Holy See, but two events that took place immediately before Prepcom III may have contributed. First, up to this point, the ICPD Secretariat had felt that something needed to be said about abortion, but they had decided to treat it as a public health problem that is responsible for a significant number of maternal deaths each year. Early drafts of the document went no further than urging governments to reduce the number of unsafe abortions. As we noted above, shortly before Prepcom III, however, under pressure from women's groups and from the US and some European governments, Nafis Sadik, Secretary-General of the conference, decided to include a modest statement on the need for safe abortion to be available in cases of rape and incest (United Nations 1992-94, A/CONF. 171 / PC/5). She felt that because these "hard" cases are widely accepted as grounds for legal abortion, they might pass muster in the Cairo document (interviews with members of the ICPD Secretariat).
Second, on 16 March the US State Department sent a cable to all diplomatic and consular posts that was leaked to delegations and other interested parties, though not immediately, it seems, to the press (US Depart-ment of State 1994a). The cable stated unambiguously: "The United States believes that access to safe, legal and voluntary abortion is a fundamental right of all women." The relevant paragraph also notes, "The current text ... is inadequate as it only addresses abortion in cases of rape and incest." The paragraph ends, "The United States delegation will be working for stronger language on the importance of access to abortion services."35 The cable significantly sharpened the US language on abortion and appears to have given the Holy See the hard evidence it needed to press its case against the United States.
There can be no doubt that John Interestingly, the considerations that prompted this denouement paralleled in some ways those that motivated the softening of the United States position. In both cases, the decision to retreat was taken by the highest authorities for political reasons that transcended the issues at stake in the ICPD. While President Clinton was concerned about the possible effects on his political power and influence in the domestic arena, Pope John Paul II wished to avoid a further decline of Catholic influence around the world.
On arrival at Cairo, the Vatican delegation had found that its alliance with Muslim countries was dissolving. The substantial number of Islamic nations that had said they would withdraw from the conference had already shrunk to four, and those countries that attended now found themselves at odds with the positions taken by the Holy See (Associated Press 1994e). Even more seriously, the support of Catholic nations seemed to be wavering. The Church had long ago lost its ability to influence Western industrialized countries over reproductive and sexual behavior; while several Latin American and African countries supported the Vatican, a number of them did so because they wished the Church to be respected rather than because of agreement on the full range of reproductive issues.43 The Philippines, the one Catholic country in Asia, resisted Church influence and argued strongly for family planning and reproductive health programs. The Church's staunchest support came from a handful of countries, the most prominent being Argentina, Benin, Ecuador, Honduras, and Malta. Finally, as the days wore on, a growing irritation over the delaying tactics and intransigence of the Holy See delegation pervaded the conference and was openly discussed in the halls and meeting rooms. For the first time, questions were being raised about the propriety of the Vatican's privileged position within the United Nations system.44 While the Vatican had put up a strong defense of its doctrine and principles, the time for reconciliation had come.
Reflections on the conference
At the start of this article we referred to the immediate assessments of the participants that the Cairo conference had been an outstanding success. There is, of course, more than one way to measure the success of international conferences like the ICPD. When participants declared forcefully that Cairo was a "landmark" meeting, they were measuring success in terms of the new symbols and concepts that entered the discourse on population. With several "firsts" to its credit-the first mention in a UN document that abortion could be legal and safe, the first time that women's interests in population matters had been broadly and seriously considered, and the unprecedented level of NGO participation-Cairo might justly be termed a landmark. If, however, the conference is viewed as a policy exercise linked to the elaboration of new policy instruments, it is still too early to make a judgment. As Finkle and Crane observed after Bucharest, "Governments do not generally address their own population problems in the context of a world conference . . . but attempt to cope with them in a far less dramatic local setting" (1975: 109). Like the United Nations itself, international conferences sponsored by the UN are free to formulate ambitious ideas that are binding on no one. Back at home, the policy proposals that may emerge have to compete with many other domestic demands for the limited resources in the national exchequer.
In an ideal world, perhaps, programs would be available in every country to satisfy all the needs and desires expressed in the Cairo Program of Action. Very few would not endorse the improvements in health, education, and social, economic, and political welfare enshrined in the Cairo recommendations. Moreover, if ample resources were available or if there were agreement on how to prioritize the objectives of the Program of Action, the recommendations adopted at Cairo would undoubtedly work to lower fertility. In the real world, however, even the richest and most benign of governments have to make hard choices against constraints on available resources. To do this, they need a clear sense of goals and priorities. The difficulty presented by the Cairo document is not that the objectives to which it aspires are less than desirable, but that it fails adequately to ad-dress the issue of rapid population growth, which many poor countries still consider the first priority.
By attempting to estimate the long-term cost of implementing the reproductive health and family planning components of the Program of Action, Cairo was the first UN conference to link policy to implementation. The initial result of this estimation is somewhat unsatisfactory, largely because, unlike the cost of family planning programs which is reasonably well known, data on which to base estimates of implementing reproductive health services are scarce. Assuming the calculations to be approximately on target, the figures arrived at for all population, family planning, and reproductive health components will be, in constant dollars, $17 billion annually by 2000, rising to $21.7 billion in 2015, compared with the current cost of population and family planning programs that was estimated to be $4.5 billion in the mid-1980s (Bulatao 1985) . 45 The proposed distribution of cost between donor and recipient countries, one-third to be provided by donors and two-thirds by recipient countries-compared to the estimated present division of approximately 25 percent from external assistance and private sources and 75 percent from recipient governmentswas thought to be out of reach by both sides. While some donors at and before Cairo announced that they would try to increase their contributions, at a subsequent meeting of donor countries held in Paris "virtually all governments were lamenting budget pressures." Referring to the euphoria of Cairo, one speaker commented, "The DAC meeting was a reality check."46
Delegates meeting in Cairo did not discuss the cost of implementing the "development" parts of the document because the only proposal on the table, the so-called 20-20 proposal, was acceptable to no one. Under this suggestion, recipient governments would have agreed to allocate 20 percent of their budgets to the social and economic programs recommended in the document, and donor countries would have earmarked 20 percent of their foreign development assistance budgets to the same programs. Luckily for the ICPD, the Secretariat and the Chairman were able to refer the topic to the Social Summit, which was held in Copenhagen in March 1995. This transfer of responsibility was made on the grounds that delegations to the population conference did not have the authority to make commitments on broader social and economic issues. The Social Summit, by contrast, was planned as a meeting of heads of state, who have more authority to commit their governments to any course of action. Nevertheless, world leaders showed themselves no more enthusiastic about any of the funding proposals presented at Copenhagen than had their colleagues at Cairo, who represented less powerful offices than heads of state and ministers of finance (The Economist 1995).
The development issues raised in the Cairo document deserve far greater attention than the international community has given them in re-cent decades. In essence, they deal with the distribution of wealth and power and thus have a critical bearing on some of the most troubling questions of our time-the increasing poverty and indebtedness of many developing countries and countries in transition, national and global security, international migration, and ultimately human rights. Population policy is a feeble instrument with which to address questions of such enormous complexity, which engage so many diverse interests and on which the protagonists are so unevenly matched in terms of power and influence. A carefully nuanced population policy that made a determined attempt to lower growth rates where they remain high might buttress the efforts of these countries to pull themselves out of poverty. A population policy" that ignores population as an aggregate phenomenon and that regards fertility decline as secondary to other objectives may be less likely to aid the development process.
Significantly, the change of direction, which paid less heed to demographic and development objectives than to women's issues, was brought about indirectly by the high level of NGO participation in the Cairo process. It will require much more time and serious study to arrive at a fair evaluation of the NGO role at Cairo; however, a few observations can be made with some confidence. First, the introduction of NGOs into the United Nations system seems to have energized what many regard as a tired and staid bureaucracy. Second, at the national level, the inclusion of NGOs in the preparatory process fostered a new, sharper discourse and disrupted the complaisance of the rigid bureaucratic political structures that are characteristic of many developing countries. However, whether the process was more democratic, as many have claimed, is still to be examined; it is unlikely that the NGOs that participated were in any way representative of, or accountable to, the diverse cultural, religious, or political constituencies within each country. Internationally, the issues of democratic representation and accountability are made more complex by the fact that donor governments and foundations were instrumental in facilitating and funding the participation of a significant number of NGOs from developing countries. While this is understandable and may have been unavoidable given the limited financial resources of many third world countries and NGOs, the questions of accountability and representativeness remain. Notwithstanding these problems, it is clearly desirable to include some kind of popular or civic participation in the policymaking process at UN conferences. The method used to achieve this objective at Cairo was somewhat deficient, but the issue is one that deserves continued attention.
It is evident that in the field of social policy UN conferences have become an institutionalized part of international relations. As a means of policy formulation, global conferences serve an important function in permitting the expression of views that might not otherwise be aired, and in widening the circle of decisionmakers. In this regard the Cairo conference may have exceeded expectations. It delivered very effectively a number of messages about the status and aspirations of women, the strengths and limits of papal power, the vitality of NGOs, and the unequal distribution of power and influence in the world.
At the same time, the Cairo conference demonstrated weaknesses that may be endemic in the UN system of global meetings. Inevitably, given the structure and conventions of the United Nations, these large global meetings produce an unwieldy, excessively comprehensive, and indigestible set of recommendations that bind no one.47 Ironically, some of the hard prioritizing that UN conferences are unable to accomplish is, in the case of Cairo, taking place as governments, UNFPA, donors, and some NGOs struggle over how to implement the Program of Action under severe resource constraints. Second, in the search for consensus, conferences are also likely to be excessively sensitive to the 'political correctness" of the day. This tendency exemplifies what has been called the "mobilization of bias," meaning that 'some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out' (Schattschneider 1960: 71) . The formulation of policy is a quintessentially political process; as such it is almost inevitably accompanied by some mobilization of bias. In most policymaking situations, the political process is to some extent informed by serious scientific analysis, which acts as a counterbalance to ideological and political preferences. At Cairo, however, the demographic objective was subordinated to other social goals; the dominant decisionmakers, therefore, saw no serious need to analyze the likely impact of the Cairo recommendations on rapid population growth in those regions where it still exists. For both critics and supporters of the new paradigm, this remains the difficult task for the coming years.
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